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FREE AND EQUAL: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINA-
TION OF POLITICAL VALUES. By Richard Norman. 1 
New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. 178. 
Cloth, $37.00; paper, $12.95. 
Jeffrey C. Cohen 2 
At the heart of the two great competing political systems of the 
twentieth century lie commitments to two great competing values. 
In the eyes of its proponents, communism's most alluring promise is 
economic equality. Western democracies, on the other hand, wave 
aloft the banner of freedom, treating civil liberties as more impor-
tant than equality. How should we choose between these ideals? 
The thesis of Professor Richard Norman's book, concisely stated, is 
that no such choice is necessary: "freedom and equality, far from 
being opposed ideals, actually coincide." If he is right, then there 
ought to be an attainable via media between Stalinism's wholesale 
curtailment of personal freedom and market capitalism's counte-
nance of unequal distribution of wealth. As he develops this thesis, 
Professor Norman provides some flashes of wisdom on related mat-
ters. But his effort to harmonize freedom and equality relies on ma-
nipulative definitions of both concepts, and his conclusions are 
unpersuasive. 
Professor Norman begins his discussion of freedom by con-
trasting John Stuart Mill's largely "negative concept," focusing on 
noninterference with an individual's actions insofar as they do not 
adversely affect others, with T.H. Green's radically "positive" and 
"social" view. Green, working from Hegelian premises, artfully 
identified freedom with "contributing to social good," and Norman 
joins Isaiah Berlin in pointing out the slippery slope toward tyranny 
onto which Green steps with this view. Norman does not mention, 
however, that Berlin, in the same article from which Norman 
quotes, called Green's view a "confusion of freedom with equal-
ity."J Norman himself now proceeds to precisely the same 
confusion. 
Norman's version of freedom aims at transcending the inade-
quacies of Mill's, while avoiding the unfortunate consequences of 
Green's. "The central element in the concept of freedom is the pos-
itive one of being able to make choices, and ... the negative fact of 
non-interference is related to it as one of the conditions for our be-
I. Professor of Philosophy, University of Kent. 
2. Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy, Columbia University. 
3. I. BERLIN, FOUR EssAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). 
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ing able to make choices." Norman here demotes Mill's noninter-
ference principle to "necessary but insufficient" status. If an 
individual has a very limited range of choices, then a government's 
mere noninterference with him does not fully enable him to make 
choices, and therefore the government is not truly ensuring his 
freedom. 
The absurdity of this position seems to me self-evident, as does 
its motivation. Professor Norman is playing an old socialist game, 
the object of which is to "load" your definition of freedom suffi-
ciently so that you can reply to the capitalist: the workers are not 
"unequal but free"; by virtue of their inequality, they are rendered 
unfree. Marx deployed this tactic repeatedly, and Frankfurt Marx-
ists such as Marcuse exploited it still further; yet contemporary 
commentators such as Jon Elster, though generally sympathetic to 
Marx, have abandoned such projects of re-definition in the interest 
of philosophical good faith.4 If freedom and equality are to be kept 
conceptually distinct-and they are certainly distinct concepts in all 
conventional understandings of the terms-freedom must mean 
something very close to noninterference. Otherwise, the important 
and interesting question of whether the two values can be reconciled 
is a nonquestion, resolved by the inflated and false definition of 
freedom. 
Thus, at this early point in Norman's book, his project and 
conclusions are foreordained. Freedom is impossible, he holds, 
without the positive assurance of a "range of meaningful choice." 
Such an assurance, we ought to respond, may be desirable from 
many points of view, and it may be labelled "widespread prosper-
ity," "distributive justice," or many other things, but it is not con-
tained in the notion of freedom. 
Professor Norman perseveres, as if he had not already decided 
the issues he is treating, and takes up the notion of equality as a 
separate concept. In seeking to establish the independent desirabil-
ity of equality, Norman first rejects a merely utilitarian justification. 
"Equality is important not just because of what it leads to [an in-
crease in the net happiness or preference-satisfaction of the world, 
as a utilitarian would argue], but because of what it is." Before 
judging his argument for equality's intrinsic value, let us examine 
what, for Norman, equality "is." 
According to Norman, equality breaks down into three compo-
nents: equality of power, equality of material goods, and equality of 
educational and cultural opportunities. All three, for Norman, are 
4. See J. ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX (1985). 
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eminently, necessarily desirable. But it is equality of power, he con-
tends, that is primary, and the necessary and sufficient condition for 
the other two. Only the most radically democratic distribution of 
power can ensure continued material and opportunity equality, as 
well as maintain itself. Without equality of power, equality of 
wealth will vanish when the most powerful people appropriate une-
qual shares. Similarly, equality of educational and cultural oppor-
tunity cannot be expected to endure in the face of great disparities 
in wealth or power. 
If Norman's errors in his discussion of freedom involved col-
lapsing distinct concepts (freedom, equality, choice, prosperity) into 
a single entity, he may be said to have committed the opposite dis-
tortion here. He makes much of the causal priority of equality of 
power to equality of wealth. But the intimacy of the relationship 
between power and wealth is not so easily dealt with. Marx's analy-
sis of that relationship remains the most persuasive. No matter how 
radically democratic a society, the rich will be able to buy not only 
goods, but also services and protection-that is, power. Thus, if 
one regards equality as the most important goal, equal distribution 
of material goods is the most plausible method to achieve it. The 
distinction between equality of wealth and equality of power cannot 
do as much as Norman wants it to do, and his contribution to egali-
tarian theory is severely compromised by his dependence on this 
distinction. 
But should equality be treated as an overriding social impera-
tive? For Norman, equality has intrinsic value because human soci-
eties are essentially "co-operative." More precisely, they are at least 
partially co-operative; admittedly most are also partially coercive or 
exploitive. "Insofar as social institutions are not co-operative, they 
ought to be." 
The first claim-that society "is" cooperative-is clearly true: 
The very formation of societies must be motivated by cooperative 
instincts, and cooperative assumptions probably underlie continued 
social cohesion. But the second, normative claim-that societies 
ought to be even more cooperative-has little support. The alterna-
tive to cooperation is not only, as Norman would have it, "coercion 
or exploitation," but also competition. And competition can be jus-
tified on various grounds, such as motivation, prosperity, innova-
tion, and morale. So the normative claim neither follows from the 
descriptive nor seems to be very sound in itself. 
At bottom, Norman's whole argument for equality rests on the 
same shaky ground. For egalitarianism, like cooperation, is of 
course a normative, prescriptive doctrine, and if Norman cannot 
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convince us of the desirability of extending "co-operation" to every 
facet of society, then by his own account he cannot do so for 
equality. 
In his penultimate chapter, Norman tries to show precisely 
how "the ideals of freedom and equality converge upon the ideal of 
equality of power." That is, the establishment of radically par-
ticipatory democracy should guarantee both "freedom" (in Nor-
man's sense of the term) and "equality" of material and cultural 
benefits-as well as self-perpetuation of equality of power. Since 
Norman's definition of freedom is intended to include-before ex-
panding upon-the minimal "non-interference" aspect of freedom, 
we are entitled to ask what will happen when, in a radically demo-
cratic and radically egalitarian society, an individual tries to im-
prove his own lot without also improving everyone else's. A 
referendum might be called, and, if Norman is right about the en-
lightened egalitarian reasoning of such a society, it would vote to 
restrain the individual from such action. Freedom-by any plausi-
ble definition-will have been abridged here. Granted, a society 
may reasonably find such an abridgment desirable or even neces-
sary. But to suggest, as Norman does, that this act of restraint from 
without is merely an enforcement of freedom is to distort beyond 
recognition and usefulness the terms involved. The above case is 
manifestly an enforcement of equality, at the expense of freedom. 
Any other account is mere word-play. 
We are left, then, with our tired, unpleasant dichotomies. 
Redefinitions will not do the trick of lifting the world from its im-
perfect equilibrium into ethereal utopia. Norman's effort to do just 
that relies on distortions of both terms and doctrines. Politics, it 
seems, is indeed a matter of hard choices, and the utopian desire to 
transcend those choices continues to yield unpersuasive and poten-
tially unpleasant formulas. The dream of "freedom and equality" is 
a lofty and admirable one, but one apparently not realizable in the 
world of imperfect humans. So long as that is the case, we ought to 
assess rationally which of the two goals is more important to us, 
and which is more feasible. To date, the historical evidence seems 
to direct us toward personal liberty. Some level of equality is surely 
desirable in light of our "co-operative" and sympathetic instincts, 
but for the short term at least, we should be wary of attempts, like 
Norman's, to "have it all." 
